A prominent software security violation -buffer overflow attack has taken various forms and poses serious threats until today.
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental purpose of software attack is to divert the intended program flows and execute unintended instructions.
The term software attack appears more generic that includes diverse types of applications ranging from Web and desktop applications to simple programs such as calculator performing addition of two numbers. A notorious form of software attack vulnerability is exploitation of memory. This comes in different forms like buffer overflow, heap overflow [1] and format string vulnerability [1] . Among them, buffer overflow vulnerability [2] is the most prominent one in which the attacker can overflow a buffer's boundary in the process' stack and overwrite the return address of a function with an arbitrary memory address such that he/she can execute any code in this overwritten address when the vulnerable function returns. Buffer overflow attack has attracted many researchers' attentions and numerous defense mechanisms have been proposed and employed to mitigate the attack.
These defense methods prevent execution of code that is present in the data regions of the process, for example in stack or/and heap. Modern operating systems employ Data Execution Prevention (DEP) using the W ⊕ X security model, in which the memory location can be either be executable or writable but cannot be both. In such a way, the attacker cannot write code and execute it at the same address of stack or heap.
Despite the employment of such methods, attackers are still able to find ways to execute unintended code by making use of already existing code in the process' address space instead of injecting new code. A well known form of this attack is the return-into-libc attack [3] . In a return-intolibc attack, the attacker overwrites the return address of a vulnerable function with the address of any function in the libc library. For example, the attacker could overwrite with the address of a 'system' function, by which a shell can be opened. A shell is a powerful backdoor which enables performing multiple operations. Return-Oriented Programming(ROP) is a specific form of the return-intolibc attack, in which the attacker tries to execute sections of code scattered across the process address space by linking them with indirect control transfer instructions, typically the 'ret' instruction. Numerous ROP exploits have been demonstrated recently that target at products like AdobeReader, AdobeFlash Player, Internet Explorer and so on. Since its appearance, ROP has being a very hot topic of research with various types of ROP attacks being proposed in parallel with some defense methods that prevent such linking of instruction sequences [4] . Among those proposed approaches, some of them are compile time approaches and some of them are dynamic.
The main contributions of this paper include:
• Briefly discuss about Return-Oriented Programming and some of the defense strategies adopted by defense mechanisms.
• Provides a high-level classification of recently proposed defense techniques and investigate some of them.
• Provides a comparative evaluation of the discussed techniques based on certain identified criteria -General Solution Correctness, ROP specific Effectiveness and Performance Metrics.
• Shows some important aspects to be considered towards developing an effective defense solution against ROP.
BACKGROUND
Return-Oriented Programming as mentioned before, is a type of return-into-libc attack [3] . As proposed by Shacham [5] [6], the attacker usually performs the attack in two steps: 1) In the first step, the attacker identifies sequence of instructions useful in performing his/her intended operations.
This short sequence of instructions is called a 'gadget' and is typically between 2 and 5 instructions in length. However there is no limitation on the gadgets' length and it has not been proven that it is infeasible to have longer gadgets. Also the attacker can identify more than one gadget.
2) Then in the second step the attacker link these identified gadgets (from the first step) together in such a way that they are executed sequentially.
An overview of the ROP exploit is shown in Figure 1 .
The attacker first finds a vulnerable function in the process address space, either belonging to the application or included in external or internal libraries, such that the function would be executed during the actual program execution. He/she then overwrites the stack data with the intended return addresses (i.e the start addresses of the gadgets). The gadgets should end in indirect control transfer instruction, mostly the 'ret' instruction serves this purpose. Every time the actual operation (gadget) is executed, the 'ret' instruction at the end of the gadget pops the next value (which is the next gadget's address) in the stack, which becomes the new EIP.
The attacker may also insert data values into the stack which can be used as arguments for the unintended instructions to be executed. [7] The technique which was first identified and explained above uses only the 'return' instruction for diverting the control flow of the program and transferring it to the unintended program's flow. However the 'return' instruction is not the only way of transferring control. There are other indirect control transfer instructions like the indirect 'jmp' and indirect 'call' instructions, in which the address of the target instructions are stored in the argument registers of these 'jmp/call' instructions. Therefore the attacker can use such instructions as well to divert the control flow and execute code that he/she intends to. This was demonstrated by Checkoway.et.al [8] in 2010 which proposed ReturnOriented Programming using return like instructions rather than directly using the return instruction. For example, the instruction sequence "pop %eax; jmp %eax;" is similar to a 'ret' instruction which pops the top of stack to EIP register and executes the instruction at the address contained in EIP. Following Checkoway.et.al's proposal, a similar technique called Jump Oriented Programming (JOP) was proposed by Bletsch.et.al [9] . JOP is very similar to ROP and it uses gadgets to perform operations which are chained together by a dispatcher gadget rather than the 'ret' instruction in ROP. The gadgets are linked through 'jmp' instructions and the dispatcher gadget takes care of executing them in sequence. The gadget sequence is stored in a dispatcher table in the process memory (overwritten by exploiting a memory vulnerability) and is independent of the stack. Therefore any ROP defense mechanism that depends only on the stack or the 'ret' instructions can detect only the original ROP attack and are vulnerable to the later proposed variations of the same.
Although a Turing-complete program can be formed using ROP, typically attackers use them targeting at only certain functions, such as 'system' functions, that spawn a shell or those functions which can change the memory settings of the process to undo certain permissions. Especially by changing the DEP setting, the attacker can directly overwrite the stack with the intended code and execute from the stack itself, instead of making a more difficult attempt of formulating a Return-Oriented Program attacks to perform the intended operations. A program binary may contain many gadgets which are helpful for the attacker. Schwartz.et,al in [10] demonstrated the existence of many potential ROP payloads (or gadgets) in more than 80% of programs that are larger than 20KB.
DEFENSE STRATEGIES
In this section we discusses certain criteria that many For example, consider the following set of instructions [7] :
B8 13 00 00 00 mov $0x13, %eax
Since a gadget is a short sequence of instructions typically ending in the 'ret' (C3) instruction, the above instruction sequence contains a potential gadget as shown below which can be exploited by the attacker (for manipulating register value): 00 00 add %al, (%eax) 00 E9 add %ch, %cl
C3 ret
Therefore a complete defense mechanism that either eliminates gadgets or enforces control flow integrity should also be able to handle such unaligned instructions for complete coverage.
In addition to ROP's specific features, following are some of the general defense strategies observed in other defense approaches. 
CLASSIFICATION OF DEFENSE APPROACHES
Based on the trend observed in recently proposed defense mechanisms, these techniques can be briefly classified as shown in Figure 2 . It is important to note that this is not the complete classification, rather it is only based on the techniques surveyed by this paper.
Randomization: Randomization includes a) Address
Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) -This technique was the first kind of defense mechanisms proposed to defend against ROP. Address Space Layout Randomization [12] randomize the base addresses of parts of the process in the process address space like the stack, heap, external libraries etc., such that the attacker cannot predict the address where these would be loaded, which in turn means he/she cannot predict the addresses of his/her intended gadgets to overwrite the stack. ASLR was used in conjunction with DEP to protect against ROP. However since only the base addresses are re-located and not for each individual address within the components, if the base address can be found, then all other addresses relative to the base address can also be found.
Roglia.et.al [13] proposed a method to find the base address of libc if the attacker can find the absolute address of any function in that library. If the base address of libc can be found, then it is easy to compute the addresses of any other functions in libc using the Global Offset A brief comparison of the different approach types is given in Table I .
PROPOSED DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
In this section we briefly discusses some of the recent proposed approaches under each type (as shown in Figure   2 ) to detect and mitigate ROP attacks. The authors of [16] used IDAPro disassembler for their prototype implementation.
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There are basically two types of modifications of instructions proposed:
• Atomic substitution As shown in Figure 3 there is a gadget formatted from unaligned instructions before transformation. The corresponding instruction can be transformed in to an equivalent form to remove the 'C3' byte in the instruction sequence.
Intra basic block re-ordering: Independent instructions within a basic block can be re-ordered such that unaligned gadgets can be eliminated. The dependence graph, which is a graph depicting relationship between the instructions of the basic blocks, can be used to identify independent
instructions. An example of re-ordering is shown in Figure 4 and its corresponding dependence graph is shown in Figure   5 .
Re-ordering Register Preservation code: Functions sometimes save register values before performing the operations and restore them at the end. These values are usually saved in the stack itself by a series of push and pop instructions.
Reordering of the push/pop instructions may modify the expected behavior of gadgets intended to happen by the attacker. This approach modifying the register saving instructions is adopted since instructions with pop/ret pattern are popular in ROP gadgets.
Register re-assignment: Live region of a register is the region between where the register is defined and last used.
The approach proposes to re-assign registers within the same boundaries of live regions, such that only the names of the registers are exchanged and the data at the corresponding 
Instruction Location Randomization
Hiser et.al, [17] proposed a randomization approach to 
Marlin
Gupta.et.al, [18] However, not every function can be randomized, since for some functions if they are changed from their original locations they may be rendered useless or even result in some exceptions, a typical example is the start function.
Therefore only those position-independent functions can be randomized.
Compiler-based approaches

Return-less kernels
Li.et.al, [19] proposed a compiler based approach to defeat return-oriented rootkits. Return-oriented rootkits as explained and demonstrated by Hund.et.al, [20] , is a Since every legitimate 'ret' instruction should be preceded by a 'call' instruction, all entries in the centralized table are valid return addresses and hence there is no probable reason for any false alarm. instruction is executed a frame cookie is computed using the same random key and pushes it into the stack. Then just before the free branch instruction, validation is performed to check for the validity of the cookie. If there is no cookie pushed or the computed value does not match with the stored cookie, it is assumed to be an attack. The authors also propose to add alignment sleds (nop instructions) before these code blocks, so that they cannot be executed in an unaligned fashion too.
G-Free
For the prevention of gadgets formation in unaligned instructions, the occurrence of the corresponding instruction bytes needs to be avoided. For example, the bytes, 'C3, C2, CA, CB' for 'ret' instructions and 'FF' for 'jmp' instruction.
The authors proposed different kinds of instruction sequence re-writing techniques to achieve the elimination. They are Register re-allocation (similar to Return-less kernel technique) -replaces register operands to remove the 'C3'
byte, Instruction transformation -replaces an instruction that has a free branch byte with an equivalent instruction, Offset Adjustments -adjust or modify the offset of the operands of the 'jmp' instruction if a 'ret' instruction byte is encountered. This offset adjustment can be done by adding nop instructions accordingly. This way, the authors claimed that it is possible to eliminate many gadgets formation.
Control Flow locking
Bletsch.et.al, [22] proposed another compiler time technique to detect Return-Oriented Programming attacks.
As discussed in Section 3, ensuring the CFI of the program prevents ROP from happening. The CFL approach targets at the same purpose -ensuring the program execution follows the pre-determined control flow. To achieve this, a mechanism similar to mutex locking is used excluding the waiting/atomicity. A lock is acquired at the entry point and unlocked at the exit point. Acquiring/releasing lock is achieved by updating a variable in memory. The technique, as with other compiler-based techniques, proposes two main ideas to protect aligned and unaligned instruction sequences:
• Remove unintended code : Unintended code can be removed by adding no-op bytes to instructions so that every instruction is aligned to a n-byte boundary. This also means that every target of indirect control flow transfer is also aligned to n-byte boundary. However, since direct calls cannot be modified by the attacker, they do not require the locking mechanism.
An overview of the proposed control flow lock checking at different locations is shown in Figure 7 . 
Dynamic Approaches
ROPDefender
Davi et.al, [7] proposed a binary instrumentation method to detect ROP attacks based on 'ret' address comparison.
The method works by maintaining a shadow stack to keep track of expected return addresses and comparing the actual return addresses with the expected addresses (Figure 8 ). PIN, a dynamic instrumentation framework is used to implement the method. ROPDefender pushes the computed return address (to be executed after the exception handling completes) by the library functions during the stack unwinding process.
Control Flow Monitoring
Chen.et.al, [25] This technique is typically implemented using the PIN instrumentation framework [23] for runtime monitoring.
Also for static and dynamic analysis of the libraries and resolution of addresses which is used during the runtime monitoring, the technique uses the IDAPro disassembler and ReadELF.
kBouncer
Pappas.et.al [26] who proposed a binary rewriting method earlier [16] , also proposed a dynamic method to monitor The authors have chosen to enforce the LBR stack check at the time the API is invoked itself, since in more than 50% of the API calls (for system call invocation), the number of legitimate branches between the API call and the actual system call exceeds the total limit on the number of the LBR registers. Therefore it is best to check at the entry point itself i.e API call itself to check if the API call was legitimate or not.
The authors proposed to identify illegitimate operations by using two key attributes:
• Illegal 'ret' instructions are not preceded by call sites.
Any 'ret' instruction should transfer control to an instruction which is located after the corresponding call site of the caller function. This is the usual flow in a normal legitimate function execution. Since ROP gadgets transfer control from 'ret' to arbitrary locations in the functions, illegal 'ret' instructions can be detected.
• Since ROP code consists of many gadgets chained test on Wine test suite, which calls windows API functions extensively.
ROPecker
Cheng.et.al [27] The method although has a minimal performance overhead, there are some scenarios when the method may not be effective and efficient. The tool works on information from a database which is formed assuming gadgets of six instructions in length. In case that the adversary can form gadgets less or more than six, and insert them in between regular gadgets, the gadget chain length may never reach the threshold and the tool would not work. Also when the gadgets fall within the sliding window, they may be executed without any exceptions raised.
ROPGuard
This is yet another dynamic method proposed by Ivan [28] which uses a technique of monitoring the execution flow • Check the stack pointer: Since the stack needs to be modified with required return addresses, the attacker may sometimes modify the stack pointer itself to point it to a different memory region than the original program stack. Therefore when a critical function is called, the stack pointer has to be checked whether or not it is within the stack boundaries of that particular thread or process.
• 
COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
In this section we provide comparative evaluations of the detection techniques discussed in the previous sections.
Tables listed here compare the techniques on different dimensions -general evaluation (Table II) , ROP specific Effectiveness (Table III) and Performance metrics (Table   IV) .
General Evaluation
In this part we focus on the general aspects of the defense techniques like: 
Coverage
Considering the coverage achieved, almost every compiletime technique achieves complete coverage, owing to the availability of the source code. Dynamic approaches also typically has full coverage with few exceptions like kBouncer [26] and ROPGuard [28] that focus only on certain API calls that are presumably the usual targets of ROP exploits. Also the coverage may not be complete for those techniques that depend on disassemblers (without debug symbols). The accuracy and completeness of the coverage of these techniques is proportional to the efficiency of the latter in recovering the instructions. There is a case in IPR [26] that only achieve 80% coverage on average. The authors claimed that this is sufficient to randomize the popular gadgets identified in today's ROP exploits. However this claim is based on their existing experiments and may not hold for other or future exploits. On the other hand, even with efficient disassembly some randomization approaches cannot achieve complete coverage. Like in the case of Marlin [18] , some functions if changed from their original location may be rendered useless/result in exception, for example, the start function. Hence only those positionindependent functions are randomized. Similarly ILR [17] also depends on disassemblers and position-independent code for randomization. Therefore the amount of positiondependent code is crucial in randomization approaches for achieving complete coverage.
Correctness
Considering the correctness of the approaches, though most of them are claimed to be false-positive proof, there could be certain conditions in which they would result in false-positive, false-negative or true-negative cases. Some of these potential conditions are shown in Table II . For example, in those techniques that depend on the accuracy of the output of pre-processing stages (offline stages), there is a chance for incorrect results. For example, consider the cases of CFL [22] , ROPecker [27] and ILR [17] . In the cases of CFL which entirely depends on the Control Flow Graph of the program, it will result in incorrect results if the CFG is not computed properly. Another insignificant cause of error is the improper computation of the 'k' value used in lock/unlock verification.
In ROPecker, the runtime ROP checking logic depends on the In some cases, the possibility of incorrect behavior is due to the limitations in the execution setup. For example, in the case of kBouncer, the ROP checking logic only checks for the authenticity of the branches in the LBR registers. If the number of LBR registers is 16, and the attacker exploits an API that has the previous 16 branches to be valid, but is still not an intended function or contains indirect branches after these 16 instructions, the tool cannot identify such attack and results in false negative since the checking logic is triggered only at the beginning of the API. Though no such instances have been reported yet, it is not infeasible. Also regarding the gadget chaining check, though current tested applications did not report legitimate instruction sequences higher than the threshold, there is no guarantee it will be the case always. In such cases, legitimate code would be termed as ROP, being a false-positive. Therefore it is essential that the defense technique caters to such exceptions by including additional checking logic to protect its correctness. 
ROP Specific Effectiveness Evaluation
In this part we focus our comparison on some ROP specific features, including gadgets, defense strategies and effectiveness as well, of the proposed defense techniques (also shown in Table III ):
• Type of gadgets that could be detected by the corresponding technique -Only 'ret' based or 'ret' and 'jmp/call' based gadgets.
• Defense strategies that are employed in the defense techniques (as discussed in Section 3 -especially the first two).
• Possible limitation on its availability or potential evasion techniques.
Type of gadgets
As we can see almost in all the discussed approaches protect against the three major types of indirect control transfer instructions -'ret', 'jmp' and 'call'. Some of the earlier approaches targeted only 'ret' based gadgets which served as a serious limitation among those techniques.
However the later proposed approaches have been designed in a wiser way of handling any indirect control transfer.
Defense strategy
Considering the defense strategy undertaken, the trend observed is nearly all dynamic and most of the compile-time approaches target to enforce control flow integrity. This is safer than gadget prevention as often times it is not possible to identify every potential gadget by analysis. It is also the case that not every gadget can be eliminated, as it is difficult to rewrite some instructions with semantically equivalent instructions. However some approaches like G-Free [21] and Return-less kernels [19] focus on both the strategies by eliminating gadgets as much as possible at pre-processing stage and ensuring CFI at the runtime (ensured by the code added at compile-time). Few other approaches target only at gadget elimination like the IPR [16] . It is interesting however that regardless of the defense strategies adopted, all these approaches handle the execution of unaligned instructions.
Availability/Evasion
Regarding the availability of the approach, a possible cause for limitation is the design itself. Techniques like kBouncer [26] and ROPGuard [28] Return-less kernel [19] Enforce CFI and eliminate gadgets ret
• If the attacker can acquire knowledge of the return indices, he can use it directly to populate the stack ROPGuard [28] Enforce CFI ret • Gadgets in other instructions excluding the critical calls can be evaded excluding the considered API to escape detection from these techniques. Considering from a different perspective, evasion can also happen due to the leakage of information which is crucial to the approach. To cite an example, in G-Free [21] if an attacker can gain access to the random key, then he/she can easily populate the stack with the encrypted/decrypted addresses and circumvent the check. Since the random key is only stored in a special file, leakage is not impossible.
As discussed by the authors too, the random key must be generated at runtime. Otherwise an asymmetric encryption could add more protection than a symmetric one, since encryption/decryption depends on different keys. Likewise in Return-less kernel [19] , if the attacker can get access to the centralized return index table, he/she can use them to populate the stack with correct indices corresponding to the gadgets intended for exploit.
Performance Metrics
In this section we focus on the performance metrics observed in the above defense techniques. In particular the following criteria are studied:
• Space overhead.
• Runtime overhead.
• Dependence on side information, i.e. source code and debug symbols.
• Dependency of the technique on any other external framework/libraries.
Space Overhead
Most of the overhead is incurred from storing the results of pre-processing stages in databases. In the case of ILR [17] , database is required for storing the identified instructions from the binary and re-write rules. In ROPecker [27] and kBouncer [26] , information about potential gadgets identified at offline stages are stored in database. Databases for shared libraries can be shared across processes. Likewise in Marlin [18] , database is required for storing the function symbols extracted that are used for randomization. In Returnless kernel [19] , the overhead is from the centralized return index [7] and Control Flow Monitoring. The approach that has the minimal overhead among all mentioned mechanisms is IPR [16] . Since the randomizations in IPR are in-place there is no requirement for additional information storage.
Runtime overhead
The runtime overhead is usually high for dynamic approaches in general owing to the actual work done during the program execution. ROP defense techniques are no exception. Particularly ROPDefender [7] and Control Flow Monitoring [25] have reported upto 2X and 3.5X average total execution time respectively. Both these approaches use the PIN framework, which is the major cause of such Randomization approaches' overhead is somewhere between the compile and dynamic time approaches. Since randomization is done for the instruction locations, there is not too much work involved during the execution of the actual application in concern. This holds well especially in the case of IPR [16] , where the very minimal overhead could be caused by some re-writing instructions that may be less optimal than the compiled version. However an approach like ILR [17] that randomizes every instruction (position-independent), the next instruction to be executed is determined at runtime only by the per-process virtual machine employed for this specific purpose. In such cases, the runtime overhead is obviously higher. In the case of Marlin [18] , the overhead is at load-time when the randomization is performed based on the symbol resolution database. The authors of Marlin also proposed to reduce the effort of pre-processing stage by making it a onetime step, rather than repeating for every execution. In fact Marlin tries to achieve a fine trade-off between the performance overhead (randomizing function blocks rather than individual instructions) and effectiveness (better compared to ASLR which randomizes only parts of process like stack and heap).
Dependence on side information
As already discussed in Section 4, compile-time approaches require source-code. Most of the other approaches do not require any side information, with few exceptions that depend on debug symbols. Although those approaches that do not depend on such information use disassemblers to retrieve the instructions (without symbolic debugging information), they cannot be guaranteed for complete coverage always. The dependence on side information for each approach is shown in the Table IV.
Dependence on framework/hardware
Almost every approach depends on disassemblers to retrieve the instruction sequences from program binary for gadget analysis. Typically IDADiassembler is used for windows applications and ReadELF for Unix applications.
Few dynamic approaches like ROPDefender [7] and Control FLow Monitoring [25] that maintain a shadow stack and compare every indirect control transfer instruction uses the PIN dynamic binary instrumentation framework for the runtime monitoring. ILR [17] depends on per-process virtual machine for fetching the next instructions. These dependencies are kind of external that needs to be integrated with the technique. Some techniques depend on built-in support (i.e. hardware) that is provided with the processor itself like in the cases of kBouncer [26] and ROPecker [27] .
These techniques depend on the LBR registers that is present in the processor itself.
DISCUSSION -TOWARDS EFFICIENT ROP DEFENSE
This section aims at discussing some of the essential factors and insights towards efficient detection and prevention of ROP attacks. Based on the observations made on surveyed defense techniques (discussed in the previous sections), the following properties are considered essential for a robust and effective approach: control flow integrity strategy, though this is more effective in ensuring the program that is not diverted from its expected behavior, it incurs higher overheads owing to the large number of indirect control transfer instructions in a typical application. To improve such overheads, it would be beneficial to implement both the strategies -gadget elimination and enforcing CFI.
• Gadget types: Though the attack started with ROP i.e only 'ret' instruction based, as put forth by Checkoway.et,al [8] and Bletsch.et.al, [9] , it could be directed via the 'jump/call' instructions as well.
Therefore an efficient defense technique must account for all types of indirect control transfer instructions -'ret', 'jmp' and 'call'. It is also important that these gadget types are covered in both aligned and unaligned instructions. • Dependency: It is not unusual or unnecessary for a defense technique to be dependent on external factors like hardware, frameworks and libraries.
But it is important that the dependency does not affect the efficiency or performance of the technique. Like in the case of kBouncer which is dependent on LBR registers, its efficiency is directly proportional to the number of available registers.
Considering performance impact, some approaches that requires an instrumentation framework, have very high overheads making their usage difficult.
• Security for ROP logic: Almost every approach is based on the assumption that the tool/ROP checking logic itself is protected from any misuse by attackers.
It is important that this expected integrity and security is guaranteed to prevent evasion.
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CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Return-Oriented Programming is a recent type of software attack that exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability. Recent advancements in this subject has resulted in various types of both -ROP exploits and ROP defense mechanisms. This paper focuses on the defense techniques particularly those proposed in recent few years. This paper provides a brief classification of the defense mechanisms and discusses some of them in details. A comparative evaluation of the techniques is also provided focusing on ROP specific parameters and certain other general parameters. This paper also provides some insights into the important aspects to be considered for future developing an efficient defense mechanism.
Besides the techniques discussed there are certain other techniques also which though not specific to ROP, can still be used in detecting such type of code re-use attacks. Also few hardware-based virtualization approaches have been proposed to mitigate ROP recently. An extended survey including these approaches as well is considered to be included in future work.
